LPG — the vapour, not the liquid
One volume of liquid propane becomes roughly 250 to 270 volumes of gas on vaporising, and that gas is heavier than air — propane vapour is about one and a half times the density of air and butane vapour about twice. That combination is the whole hazard: a leak does not disperse upward, it flows downhill and collects in trenches, pits, basements, bilges, cable ducts and the bottom of a cargo hold, where it will sit at an ignitable concentration long after the leak has stopped. Propane is flammable in air over roughly 2 to 10 % by volume, which is a narrow window that a modest leak reaches quickly in a confined space. LPG is odourless as produced, so an odorant such as ethyl mercaptan is added specifically so that a leak is detectable below the lower flammable limit; a cargo delivered without odorant, where the destination requires it, is a safety defect rather than a specification variance. Liquid LPG also expands substantially with temperature — propane by roughly 0.3 % per degree Celsius, more than ten times the rate of water — so cylinders and tanks are never filled liquid-full. Filling is controlled by a maximum filling ratio, and the ratio is set by mass against the vessel's water capacity, not by volume: 0.42 kg per litre for propane and 0.51 kg per litre for n-butane under ADR packing instruction P200. Charged on that basis a propane cylinder still retains a vapour cushion of roughly a fifth of its volume at normal filling temperature, and that cushion is the only thing standing between the liquid and the shell when the vessel sits in the sun. Overfilling removes that margin, the relief valve becomes the only thing between the vessel and hydraulic rupture, and a vessel engulfed in fire can fail catastrophically as a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion. The filling ratio is set against the vessel and the product, and is the one number on an LPG shipment that must never be treated as a target to be rounded up. For transport, propane is UN 1978, butane is UN 1011 and liquefied petroleum gases are UN 1075, all Class 2.1.
Residual fuel oil and CST 180 — heat and hydrogen sulphide
Residual fuel has to be heated to be pumped and heated further to be atomised, and every one of its hazards follows from that. The temperatures are not arbitrary, they are set by viscosity: a fuel is stored warm enough to stay mobile, brought to the pump at a viscosity the pump can lift, and heated at the burner or injector until the viscosity falls into the narrow band that will atomise. In round terms, storage of a 180 mm²/s grade sits around 40 to 50 °C and always at least 10 °C above the cargo's own pour point; transfer and pumping sit around 45 to 60 °C; and a centrifugal separator inlet runs near 98 °C. Final heating is set by what the equipment needs, and that is not one figure: a diesel injector wants 10 to 15 mm²/s, which takes a 180 mm²/s fuel to roughly 115 to 125 °C and a 380 mm²/s fuel to roughly 135 to 145 °C, whereas a boiler burner wants a thicker 15 to 25 mm²/s and a 180 mm²/s fuel reaches that lower, around 95 to 115 °C. Treat those as the shape of the problem and take the actual figures from the equipment manufacturer and the batch viscosity, because heating past what the fuel needs is not free: it cracks the fuel, cokes the heater surfaces and drives the vapour space hazard below. Hydrogen sulphide partitions out of the liquid into the vapour space of a heated tank and concentrates there; the ISO 8217 limit of 2.00 mg/kg applies to the liquid phase to IP 570 and is not a measure of headspace concentration. Opening a heated residual fuel tank, or entering one, is confined space work requiring gas testing, ventilation and a permit, and hydrogen sulphide deadens the sense of smell at exactly the concentrations that matter. The 60 °C minimum flash point in ISO 8217 is not an arbitrary commercial line either: SOLAS restricts oil fuel used in machinery spaces to a flash point of not less than 60 °C, so a cargo below that figure is a statutory failure. Water in a hot tank is the other classic incident: free water reaching a heating coil or a hot layer flashes to steam and can foam the tank over.
EN 590 diesel and base oil — the flash point sets the rules
Diesel to EN 590 has a flash point above 55 °C and travels as UN 1202, Class 3, packing group III. It is not a low-flash product, but it accumulates static charge during high-velocity loading into a tank or a drum, and the standard controls are bonding, earthing and a reduced initial fill rate rather than anything exotic. Base oil is a low acute hazard material with a flash point from about 200 °C upward, and its real risk is not the bulk liquid but oil mist: a fine mist of a high flash point oil ignites far below the flash point of the liquid, which is what makes leaking high-pressure lines in a blending plant dangerous. For both, the significant health exposure is repeated or prolonged skin contact rather than a single incident.
Sulphur — dust, acid and the IMSBC Code
Solid sulphur is a combustible solid and its dust is the problem. Suspended sulphur dust has one of the lowest minimum ignition energies of any industrial dust — low enough that an electrostatic discharge is a credible ignition source, not a theoretical one. Sulphur is an excellent electrical insulator, so it accumulates charge readily as it is poured, conveyed, screened and blown, and the charge has nowhere to go. That is why bonding and earthing of chutes, conveyors, hoppers, bagging heads and the operators themselves is a control rather than a courtesy, why free-fall discharge heights are kept short, and why dust is suppressed at the point it is generated rather than cleaned up afterwards. Burning sulphur produces sulphur dioxide, which is acutely irritant, heavier than air and will therefore follow the same low ground the dust settled on. Friability matters for safety as well as for weight loss: a product that abrades during handling generates the dust that creates the hazard, which is one reason granular product is often specified over prilled. Molten sulphur evolves hydrogen sulphide and hydrogen polysulphides into the tank vapour space, where it can reach concentrations that are immediately dangerous while the liquid below still tests clean, so heated sulphur storage carries the same confined space discipline as heated fuel oil: gas test, ventilate, permit, and never rely on smell, because hydrogen sulphide destroys the sense of smell at exactly the concentrations that matter. Sulphur wetted with water forms acid and is corrosive to mild steel, so cargo hold coatings, bag liners and stowage away from moisture are practical requirements rather than preferences. Shipment in bulk is governed by the IMO IMSBC Code, which carries distinct cargo schedules for formed solid sulphur and for crushed lump and coarse grained sulphur. Solid sulphur carries UN 1350, Class 4.1, packing group III, though in practice that classification bites on crushed lump and coarse grained material rather than on the export mainstream, because Special Provision 242 lifts shaped product out of the dangerous goods regime entirely. Molten sulphur is a separate entry again, UN 2448. The shipper's cargo declaration is required before loading, and it cannot be produced retrospectively.
Urea — ammonia on decomposition, and water damage
Urea is not flammable and is not classified as a dangerous good for transport, which is why it is the easiest of the seven to move and the one whose hazards are most often dismissed. It melts at about 133 °C and decomposes above that, releasing ammonia and forming biuret; a fire in a urea store therefore produces an irritant ammonia atmosphere and destroys the product quality at the same time. The dust is an eye and respiratory irritant. The dominant commercial risk, though, is moisture: urea is hygroscopic, and a cargo that takes on water cakes into solid lumps that no spreader will handle, which is the standard damage claim on this product. Stow it away from moisture, keep the bag liners intact, and treat a torn liner as a quality issue rather than a packaging one. Urea and its solutions are also corrosive to copper and copper alloys, which is why diesel exhaust fluid systems are built in stainless steel and why a copper-lined tank is the wrong tank.
Every one of these products has a Safety Data Sheet, and on this range the SDS is a working document rather than a filing requirement. Several destination customs authorities request it at import, many terminals will not accept a cargo without it, and for LPG and sulphur it carries the transport classification the carrier needs before the booking is confirmed.